sometimes fail to identify important causal relationships (e.g. smoking and lung cancer). 5 Indeed, in that instance it took many years for basic research to catch up.
Fifth, some of the most important diseases that now needed to be investigated (e.g. coronary heart disease) appeared to have multiple causes (roughly synonymous terms are 'multifactorial aetiology or 'web of causation). 6 To cope with the complexity, appropriate statistical methods were needed. Multivariate methods that could to a greater or lesser extent allow for and discriminate among multiple risk factors ('risk indicators', 'third variables', 'covariates') already existed, or were being developed or refined. Initially multivariate methods had been used mainly in the social sciences, and when early attempts were made to apply them in epidemiological research they commonly proved to be infeasible, mainly because they were too time-consuming and expensive. Fortunately, however, rapid advances in computer technology soon enabled epidemiologists to undertake far more complex analyses than had previously been possible.
Epidemiology today and in the future
Today epidemiology is established as a leading discipline in causal research, and now it is also appreciated that such research is best conducted by close collaboration among all relevant disciplines -basic and applied -and that causality (or protection) is most strongly supported when several lines of investigation all converge on the same relatively invariate association. Striking recent examples are the association of Helicobacter pylori infection with peptic ulcer disease and gastric cancer 7 and HIV infection with Kaposi's sarcoma. 8 When appropriate, a further important function of epidemiology has been to demonstrate with reasonable confidence when a given exposure is not associated with an alleged increase in risk (e.g. the allegation that calcium channel blocking drugs cause cancer). 9 There can be no doubt that in the future epidemiology will continue to play a prominent role in causal research. However, its very success has at the same time engendered certain paradoxes. One paradox is that under the impact of technical advances in epidemiological and statistical methods, and in the methods used in controlled trials, the limitations intrinsic to those methods are often being lost sight of. Causal research in epidemiology was originally conducted mostly by clinicians who were evaluating clinical phenomena, and who recognised that the inherent uncertainty of clinical judgment, as applied to any individual patient, inevitably translated to some degree of uncertainty when applied to quantitative clinical evidence in a group of patients. Today much of the research is carried out by persons with little or no clinical insight, sometimes with unfortunate, and biased, results.
A related paradox is that while refinements in methods have improved precision, the findings yielded by those methods have also come more and more to be represented as being more definitive than is justified by the evidence. In addition, some epidemiologists seem to have lost sight of the principle that good science is sceptical science (not nihilist, but sceptical), that good scientists have a duty to do everything they can to falsify their own hypotheses, and that they should only reluctantly embrace them, and then only tentatively, when they fail to do so. 10 They should also always be at pains to draw attention to the defects in their own research.
And still a further paradox is that epidemiological methods are now represented as being so complex, and opaque, as to be beyond the comprehension of the uninitiated: only high priests initiated into the arcana can interpret the evidence for the laity. And a consequence of that representation is that a large volume of poor research, camouflaged by the arcana, is now published.
These developments are unfortunate. One of the strengths of epidemiology is its simplicity -and with all the advances that have been made, fundamentally it remains a simple discipline. When evidence is presented that seems at first sight to be impenetrable, there is no reason why a clinical audience should be intimidated. Clinicians should be able to decipher the evidence for themselves. My purpose in this series of articles is to demystify some of the arcana, and to assist the Journal's readers in doing likewise. The series of articles is organised as follows: following these introductory comments, Part 1 (in this issue of the Journal) commences with definitions and methods relevant to causal research, and then moves on to principles of causality. 11 Part 2 (July 2008 issue) will cover additional principles of causality: confounding, effect modification and strength of association. 12 Part 3 (October 2008 issue) will cover further principles of causality: statistical stability, dose-and duration-response effects, internal consistency, external consistency, analogy and biological plausibility, and will put forward some conclusions. 13 
